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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN R. REMINGTON, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 860031 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the 
Court on March 31, 1987. Originally this case was an appeal from 
convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated Robbery, a felony 
of the first degree and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a felony of the second degree and of Being a 
Habitual Criminal, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A summary of the facts is set forth in Brief of Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief 1-4). 
ARGUMENT 
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Remington, Opinion No. 
860031 (Utah 1987), this Court has either overlooked or 
misapprehended the arguments presented by Appellant and has 
misstated and overlooked certain facts critical to this case. (See 
Addendum A). 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
This case involves a request for a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction in a jury trial which occurred prior to 
this Court's decision in State v, Longy 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
This Court followed the standard applicable to such cases as 
clarified in State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986) and State v. 
Quevedo, Opinion No, 19049 (Utah 1987), both o£ which were decided 
after Appellant submitted his brief. The applicable pre-Long 
standard is as follows: 
"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a 
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness 
identification instruction . . . was given, 
[citations omitted] However, this Court also 
stated prior to Long that the failure to give an 
eyewitness instruction might be an abuse of 
discretion where there were serious questions 
about the reliability of the eyewitness 
identification. [citations omitted] (emphasis 
added). 
State v. Quevedo, supra at 2. 
In State v. Jonas, supra, this Court held for the first 
time that a trial judge had abused his discretion in failing to give 
a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction. In that case, 
serious questions as to the reliability of the identification arose 
where: (1) the victim had little opportunity to observe his 
assailant; (2) the witness initially described his assailant as 
clean-shaven, but later changed his description to include a 
mustache; (3) the witness described an assailant with a crooked 
nose yet selected a photo of the Appellant who did not have a 
crooked nose; (4) the victim's trial testimony showed that he was 
uncertain and hesitant in the way in which he selected the defendant 
during the photo array; and, (5) there were no other witnesses or 
corroborating evidence. 
- 2 -
In State v. Quevedo, supra, this Court did not find serious 
questions as to the reliability of the eyewitness identification and 
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing 
to give a cautionary instruction. In that case, four police 
officers, trained to make such identifications, positively 
identified the defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing 
the scene of a robbery. One of the officers had known the defendant 
for three years. The officers located Quevedo in a nearby 
apartment, shortly after the fleeing getaway car crashed. An 
occupant of the apartment stated, "I don't know what he done, he 
just ran in here." When arrested, Quevedo wore the same jacket that 
the fleeing driver had worn. 
The identification in the present is subject to serious 
concerns as to its reliability similar to those in Jonas. As was 
the case with the victim in Jonas, Mr. Cruser, the victim in this 
case, had little opportunity to view his assailant. Mr. Cruser was 
unable to get much of a look at his assailant's face. He viewed it 
briefly as the person entered and left the store (T. 81-82). During 
most of the three to five minutes that the robber was in the store, 
Mr. Cruser was lying on the floor and could see only his pants and 
shoes (T. 72). 
Mr. Cruser's trial testimony established his own 
uncertainty as to the identification of Mr. Remington as the 
assailant. He never made an in court identification of Mr. 
Remington even though Remington's appearance on the day of the trial 
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was the same as it had been on the day of the robbery (T. 152). On 
direct examination, the prosecutor did not ask Mr. Cruser for an in 
court identification of his assailant. Instead, the prosecutor 
focused on Mr. Cruser's identification of Mr. Remington from a photo 
spread (T. 67-81). On cross-examination by counsel for Mr. Kalisz, 
Mr. Cruser positively identified Mr. Kalisz as the robber after 
reviewing the photograph of Mr. Remington which he had previously 
identified (T. 92).1 Mr. Cruser also acknowledged that he had told 
the prosecutor that he was not sure Mr. Remington had committed the 
crime unless he dyed his hair (T. 91). 
Mr. Cruser's description of his assailant did not fit Mr. 
Remington, just as the initial description of his assailant by the 
victim in Jonas did not fit the defendant in that case. Cruser 
described a sandy haired man with a light moustache and selected 
Kalisz. (T. 89-90, 92, 96). Mr. Remington has dark brown hair (T. 
52). 
Clearly, Mr. Cruser's in court identification of Kalisz, 
not Remington, as his assailant coupled with his failure to identify 
Remington at all in person even though Remington's appearance had 
not changed, raised serious doubts as to the reliability of Cruser's 
identification of Remington from a photo spread. 
1 The record as to which defendant is being identified by witnesses 
is slightly confusing. Mr. Cruser identifies the man in the tan 
coat as looking more like his assailant than anyone else (T. 92). 
Officer Faraone later clarifies that the defendant in the caramel 
colored jacket is Kalisz (T. 123). 
- 4 -
Mr. Cruser testified that he thought his assailant had been 
in the store earlier in the day (T. 69-70). Linking this testimony 
to Mr. Remington raises the same serious doubts as to reliability 
since Mr. Cruser did not positively identify Mr. Remington as the 
robber and demonstrated his own inability to accurately perceive, 
recall and identify an individual. 
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious 
doubts as to the identification of Mr. Remington as the robber did 
not exist in this case. In its opinion in this case, the court 
focused on Malidina Engelhardt's identification of Mr. Remington as 
the man in her store twenty minutes before the robbery as an 
important factor in showing the reliability of Mr. Cruser's 
identification of Mr. Remington from the photo spread. However, Ms. 
Engelhardt's identification does not place Mr. Remington in the 
Cruser jewelry store and is as susceptible to problems with 
eyewitness identification as the testimony of Mr. Cruser. Ms. 
Engelhardt was talking to her boyfriend when a man entered her store 
(T. 43). The man stood ten feet away and wore a baseball cap and 
sunglasses (T. 44). He was in the store three to four minutes, but 
she did not really look at him (T. 51). Clearly, Ms. Engelhardt did 
not have much of an opportunity to view the man in her store. 
After the robbery, officers took Ms. Englehardt to view Mr. 
Kalisz. She looked at him for three to four minutes, then told 
officers he was not the man who had been in her store because Mr. 
Kalisz was thinner, had long blonde hair and wore a blue terry cloth 
rather than cotton shirt. After inspecting Mr. Kalisz for up to 
four minutes on the day of the robbery, she did not remember him at 
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trial (T. 60-61). Her own testimony showed her ability to recall 
faces and persons was subject to scrutiny and emphasized the need 
for a cautionary instruction in regard to her identification of the 
man in her store. Her identification twenty minutes before the 
incident in a location other than the scene of the crime is in stark 
contrast to the identification made by four trained police officers 
immediately after following a fleeing suspect in Quevedo. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court stated that the man 
in Ms. Engelhardt's store asked her what time it was. The record 
reveals that the man never asked her what time it was; instead, he 
asked her what time the store closed, at which point Ms. Engelhardt 
looked at her watch (T. 45). 
The Court also stated that Remington left in the direction 
of Cruser Jewelry. The record reveals that Ms. Engelhardt testified 
that approximately twenty minutes before the robbery, the man exited 
her store to the north, but that she did not watch where he went (T. 
58-59). The record does not establish that the man in Ms. 
Engelhardt's store went towards Cruser Jewelry. 
In its opinion, this Court stated that "a robbery had taken 
place in the Brickyard Plaza and that the search centered on a black 
Monte Carlo getaway car which had spun out and hit the curb before 
leaving the Brickyard Plaza." State v. Remington, supra at 2. The 
record reveals that two independent investigations occurred 
simultaneously immediately after the robbery. One investigation 
involved an attempt to locate Mr. Remington and the Monte Carlo he 
had borrowed from Mr. Argyle's car lot (T. 118-120). The other 
involved a search for a suspect in the Cruser Jewelry robbery and 
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included information that some children saw a black car spin on 
gravel at the Brickyard Plaza (T. 134, 187). Neither the children 
nor anyone else who allegedly saw a black getaway car testified at 
trial. The statement that the getaway car hit the curb and was a 
Monte Carlo appear to be Officer Faraone's embellishment of the 
broadcast regarding a black getaway car at Brickyard Plaza. 
In its opinion, this Court focused on the alleged scuff 
mark on the Monte Carlo as corroborating evidence which rendered Mr. 
Cruser's failure to identify Remington at trial negligible. Officer 
Faraone testified that there was no indication the Monte Carlo was 
damaged from hitting a curb, but that on the right rear tire there 
was a scuff mark (T. 136). Mr. Argyle, the car's owner, did not 
mention a scuff mark and did not establish that if there were a 
scuff mark, it was not present when the car left his lot. He 
testified that other than the possibility that the stickers might 
have been removed and reapplied, nothing about the car was amiss (T. 
26). As previously outlined, noone testified who had allegedly seen 
the car leave the brickyard and hit the curb. Where the state 
presents no evidence that the mark was not there when the car left 
the lot and no foundational evidence as to what exactly was seen in 
regard to a getaway car and damage to that car, the jury could only 
speculate as to whether the scuff mark tied Mr. Remington to the 
robbery. This is not evidence which overcomes the serious doubts 
raised by Mr. Cruser's inconclusive identification testimony. 
In addition, in the opinion in State v. Kalisz, Opinion No. 
860032 (Utah 1987), (See Addendum B), this Court stated that nothing 
in the evidence tied Mr. Kalisz to the getaway car. If Mr. Kalisz 
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who was positively identified by numerous witnesses as the person 
who drove the Monte Carlo into Steve's Used Car Lot, cannot be tied 
to the getaway car, then, conversely, the getaway car cannot be 
linked to the Monte Carlo and its alleged scuff mark. Based on the 
decision in Kalisz that Kalisz could not be linked to the getaway 
car, any evidence relating to the Monte Carlo should be disregarded. 
The opinion in this case points out that Kalisz1 statement 
that he had taken Remington to the hospital for an appendicitus 
attack, coupled with evidence that the statement was false, is 
evidence on which the jury could have relied. However, the state 
did not establish that Mr. Remington had not checked into the 
hospital. The prosecutor asked a hearsay question in an attempt to 
establish that Mr. Remington had not gone to the hospital. Defense 
counsel objected and the answer was stricken (T. 143-144). The jury 
should not have considered the answer as evidence, nor should this 
court in determining whether corroborating evidence sufficient to 
outweigh the serious concerns raised by Mr. Cruser's testimony 
existed.2 
As outlined in Appellant's brief, the watch found on Mr. 
Remington's person provides very little evidence. The watch is a 
very common brand without serial number. Noone knew whether Mr. 
Remington had the watch with him when he left the prison that 
morning. 
2 The State in its brief asked the Court to speculate that Mr. 
Remington had not been to the hospital since he showed up at prison 
later that evening (Respondent's Brief at 8). However, absent 
evidence as to the time Remington allegedly checked in, the length 
of time one generally spends in the hospital with an appendicitus 
attack, or evidence that an individual who incorrectly believes he 
has appendicitus and goes to the hospital is never released the same 
day, the court simply cannot make such a leap in the evidence. 
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Finally, the timing involved in this incident enhances the 
doubt caused by Mr. Cruser's failure to identify Mr. Remington in 
court. The robbery occurred at approximately 5:20 p.m.; Cruser's 
alarm at his Brickyard Plaza store went off at 5:31. The Monte 
Carlo arrived downtown several miles away, in the midst of rush hour 
traffic at 5:46. According to the state's theory, in approximately 
sixteen minutes, Kalisz picked up Remington, dropped off both 
Remington and all the items taken in the robbery and drove to 
Steve's Car Lot. 
A careful review of the facts in this case establishes that 
they are aligned with those in Jonas. Mr. Cruser, the only person 
to witness the robbery, raised some very serious concerns as to the 
reliability of his photo identification of Mr. Remington. The 
remaining evidence presented by the State failed to corroborate that 
identification and did not overcome the serious doubts that Mr. 
Remington was the person in Cruser Jewelry Store. Because of this, 
the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to give the 
requested cautionary identification instruction. 
II. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
Although the State argues that it presented sufficient 
evidence to convict Remington, it concedes that "the evidence 
presented by the State at trial was not overwhelming." State v. 
Remington, Respondent's brief at 7. 
In the per curiam opinion in State v. Kalisz, Opinion No. 
860032 (Utah 1987), this Court held that insufficient evidence 
existed to convict Mr. Remington's co-defendant, Stephen Kalisz, of 
Armed Robbery. In that case, this Court noted that that: 
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"The state failed to present any evidence that 
placed Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in 
the get away car or linked him to the crime 
through the possession of any of the stolen 
goods. Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued that 
Kalisz provided transportation to and from the 
scene of the robbery and should therefore be 
convicted as Remington's accomplice." 
State v. Kalisz, supra at 3. 
Yet in this case, the Court held that there was sufficient 
evidence to convict Mr. Remington and to overcome the serious doubts 
raised by Mr. Cruser's testimony. As previously outlined, this 
Court linked Mr. Remington to the robbery through the black Monte 
Carlo returned to Steve's car lot by Kalisz. However, in the Kalisz 
opinion, this Court stated that the evidence did not link Kalisz to 
the getaway car. This is an inconsistent view of the same 
evidence. If the evidence was insufficient to link Kalisz to the 
getaway car, it was equally insufficient to link Remington to the 
Monte Carlo, and the evidence relating to the Monte Carlo should be 
disregarded. 
As previously outlined in Point I of this Petition and 
Point II of Appellant's brief, Mr. Cruser failed to identify Mr. 
Remington in court as his assailant and, in fact, identified Kalisz 
as the robber. Mr. Cruser had a limited view of the robber's face, 
yet his only identification of Mr. Remington consists of a head shot 
black and white photograph. Clearly, a photograph does not present 
the same details as to height, weight and body build and is more 
subject to error than an in person view of an individual. 
The prosecutor was willing to ignore as unreliable Mr. 
Cruser's in court identification of Mr. Kalisz as the robber and 
argue that Kalisz was in the getaway car. However, the State then 
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relied on the photograph identification to establish that Mr. 
Remington was in the store. The identification testimony of Mr. 
Cruser was wholly inconclusive and insufficient as a matter of law 
to establish that Mr. Remington was the robber. 
As previously outlined in this Petition and Appellant's 
brief, the remaining evidence was replete with flaws and failed to 
place Mr. Remington in Cruser's Jewelry Store. No stolen property 
was recovered from either defendant or the Monte Carlo. No 
fingerprints belonging to either man were found at the crime scene. 
As previously stated in Appellant's brief, several gaps in the 
evidentiary fabric exist and the gaps may be crossed only by sheer 
speculation. Speculation is insufficient to sustain a conviction 
for armed robbery. Absent sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction for armed robbery, the convictions for Possession of a 
Weapon by a Restricted person and Being an Habitual Criminal 
necessarily fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this court overlooked and misstated critical issues 
of fact and law in this case, the Appellant respectfully petitions 
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse his 
conviction and remand his case to the district court for either 
dismissal of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted on this jQTX day of April, 1987. 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Petitioner 
*KJKJ 
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I, KRIS HARROLD, hereby certify that a four copies of the 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
The State of Utah, No. 860031 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v . March 3 1 , 1987 
John R. Remington, 
Defendant and Appellant, Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant John R. Remington appeals from convictions 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree 
felony, and of being a habitual criminal. Before this Court, 
Remington claims error in the trial court's refusal to give a 
cautionary jury instruction concerning eyewitness identifica-
tion and in the jury's conviction on insufficient evidence. 
We affirm. 
On Saturday, August 17, 1985, between 2:00 and 
2:30 p.m., Remington and a friend, John Kalisz, arrived at a 
used car lot at Eighth South and Main Streets in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Remington asked the owner if he could test drive 
a black 1978 Monte Carlo around the block. He left the truck 
in which he had arrived behind on the lot. When he did not 
return by 5:00 p.m., the owner searched Remington's truck, 
found a Utah State Prison pass bearing Remington's picture, 
and contacted the prison and then the police. Officer Faraone 
arrived at the car lot at 5:30. 
At 5:00 p.m., Remington entered Earth's Originals, a 
jewelry store at Brickyard Plaza, where Malinda Engelhardt, an 
employee, was talking to a friend. Remington placed himself 
in a corner, looked out the window, and asked Engelhardt what 
time it was and when the store closed, as he was bringing his 
wife in later. Remington then left in the direction of Cruser 
Jewelry. Engelhardt testified that Remington wore a light 
blue shirt, washed Levis, a baseball cap, and sunglasses. She 
did not notice what shoes he wore. Four days after the 
robbery, Engelhardt identified Remington from a photo spread 
as the man who had been in her store. 
Reed Cruser, the seventy-eight-year-old owner of 
Cruser Jewelry, testified that the man who robbed him had been 
in his store' around 2:00 p.m. that day and entered a second 
time around 5:20 p.m., displaying a gun and ordering Cruser to 
go to a back room and lie face down before he swept into a 
large plastic sack jewelry and watches from drawers and the 
display case. Cruser's burglar alarm went off at 5:31 p.m. 
At 5:46 p.m., Officer Faraone at the used car lot 
received word from dispatch that a robbery had taken place at 
the Brickyard Plaza and that the search centered on a black 
Monte Carlo getaway car which had spun out and hit the curb 
before leaving the Brickyard Plaza. Within minutes, Kalisz 
arrived at the used car lot in the Monte Carlo without 
Remington and was asked where Remington was. Kalisz reported 
that he had taken Remington to St. Mark's Hospital with an 
attack of appendicitis. A check with the hospital revealed 
that that statement was false. The Monte Carlo had a scuff 
mark on the side wall of the right rear tire. The price 
stickers had been removed and replaced, but no incriminating 
evidence was found inside the car. A backup officer at the 
scene testified that Kalisz wore a light blue shirt and high 
boots, but could not recall whether he wore Levis or corduroy 
pants. 
Cruser was brought to the used car lot to confront 
Kalisz. Cruser testified that when the robber entered his 
store, he wore a blue shirt, tan pants, and gym shoes. He 
stated that he did not get a good look at the robber's face 
because he could see only the tan pants and gyro shoes after he 
lay down on the floor. At the car lot, Cruser thought Kalisz 
might be the man who robbed him, but noticed that he wore brand 
new boots' instead of gym shoes and was dressed differently. 
Two or three days after the robbery, Cruser identified Remington 
from the same photo spread that was shown to Engelhardt for 
identification, but was unsure and confused at trial whether 
Remington was the robber. Remington and Kalisz were tried 
together, and some of the confusion may have been caused by the 
prosecution, who identified the two defendants by their 
respective counsel. 
Remington returned to the prison late on the day of 
the robbery. He wore tan pants, gym shoes, and a white t-shirt, 
as well as a Buiova watch which bore a stamped "?3" and fresh 
glue from a removed price tag on the back. Cruser testified 
that he had recently returned to the display case an older-model 
Bulova watch that had been laid away and never picked up by a 
customer and that the "¥2" on the back meant it was a 1983 
model. Cruser stated that the watch was a commonly available 
watch that he carried in his store. The prison warden did not 
know whether Remington had worn the watch on the morning of the 
robbery when he left the prison on a work release. 
I n
 State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986), we 
abandoned our theretofore discretionary approach to cautionary 
jury instructions and directed "that in cases tried from this 
date forward (June 20, 1986) trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central 
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the 
defense." In Long, the State's case hinged on uncorroborated 
eyewitness testimony of a single witness, the victim of the 
crime. In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court 
No. 860031 2 
was again faced with a case in which the victim of the crime was 
the only eyewitness on whose uncorroborated testimony the jury 
had convicted the defendant without the aid of a cautionary 
instruction on eyewitness identification. We noted there, as 
we do here, that the holding in Long could not be applied 
retroactively to the case before us, as it was tried before our 
decision in Long was rendered. We then continued in Jonas: 
In each of our pre-Long cases involving the 
refusal of a trial court to give a caution-
ary instruction, we have held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion under the 
particular circumstances presented, although 
we did expressly recognize "that under suit-
able circumstances a cautionary instruction 
of the type requested would be required." 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d at 316. 
We then distinguished State v. Jonas as presenting a 
classic example of circumstances under which a cautionary 
instruction on reliability of eyewitnesses was necessary, 
reciting the particular facts of that case. 
In contrast, the case before us today fits easily into 
the rubric of all those pre-Long cases that we cited in Jonas, 
Corroborating evidence of Remington's presence at the Brickyard 
Plaza around the time of the robbery came from Engelhardt, who 
positively identified him from a photo spread. There was other 
inculpating, albeit circumstantial, evidence that rendered the 
discrepancies in Cruser's testimony negligible when balanced 
against the demonstrable evidence, such as the scuff mark on 
the car and the items worn by Remington upon his late return to 
the prison. The sighting of the Monte Carlo at the Brickyard 
Plaza immediately after the robbery, the return of that car to 
the used car lot within a short time thereafter, the absence of 
Remington in the Monte Carlo and at the hospital, all consti-
tuted evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
Remington was the man who had robbed Cruser. Under the 
circumstances, the trial court's refusal to give the jury 
Remington's requested cautionary instruction* may not be 
regarded as an abuse of discretion. 
Yl We note the State's request that we not address Remington's 
claimed error with respect to the requested jury instruction as 
he failed to object to the trial court's refusal to give the 
instruction. We generally decline to review claimed error 
under those circumstances, State v. Evans, 688 P.2d 566 (Utah 
1983), and notice failure to give an instruction without 
objection only when that failure would plainly result in a 
miscarriage of justice. State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 
1983) . Though the trial court's failure in this case did not 
result in a miscarriage of justice, we have addressed the issue 
here only because of our intervening decision in Long. 
3 No. fifinmn 
In light of what has just been said, our deferential 
review of the jury's verdict precludes us from substituting our 
judgment for that of the jury so long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings 
of all the requisite elements of the crime could be reasonably 
made* State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
The convictions are affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the 
result. 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 860032 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v . March 3 1 , 1987 
Stephen John Kalisz, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant Stephen John Kalisz appeals from his 
conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony under 
section 76-6-302 of the Utah Criminal Code. Kalisz's con-
viction stems from the same aggravated robbery charge that 
resulted in the conviction of John R. Remington, State v. 
Remington, slip op. 860031, filed March 31, 1987. Kalisz's 
appeal raises the same legal issues advanced in Remington: 
(1) failure of the trial court to give a cautionary eyewitness 
instruction, and (2) insufficiency of the evidence to convict 
Kalisz of aggravated robbery. We reverse the conviction for 
insufficiency of evidence and do not reach the remaining issue. 
The State concedes that under our standard of review 
of jury verdicts in criminal cases, the evidence presented at 
trial appears to have been insufficient to support defendant's 
conviction. State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). In reviewing a defen-
dant's conviction, we do not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury. "So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry 
stops." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
However, our narrow independent review of the record in this 
case leads us to conclude that here there was no evidence from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime could 
reasonably have been drawn. We therefore reverse. 
The facts of this case are stated at length in 
Remington and will be repeated here only briefly. Remington 
was accompanied by Kalisz when he arrived in his truck at a 
used car lot at 8th South and Main Streets in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to test drive a 1978 Monte Carlo. Kalisz was the man who 
returned the Monte Carlo to the used car lot hours later and 
within minutes after a robbery had been reported at the 
Brickyard Plaza* Kalisz admitted to the police officer at the 
used car lot that he had been the man who was with Remington 
when they picked up the Monte Carlo and that he had driven 
around with Remington for "a couple of hours.1' Kalisz also 
claimed to have taken Remington to a local hospital with an 
attack of appendicitis. That statement was proven to be 
untrue. Kalisz was arrested and searched. No incriminating 
evidence was found on his person or in the car. A search of 
Kalisz's residence turned up no evidence of the robbery. 
6 JThe State failed to present any evidence that placed 
Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in the getaway car or 
linked, him to the crime through possession of any of the stolen 
goods.) Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued that Kalisz provided 
transportation to and from the scene of the robbery and should 
therefore be convicted as Remington's accomplice. U.C.A., 
1953, § 76-2-202 (1978 ed.).1 The circumstantial evidence 
connecting Kalisz to Remington and the crime is insufficient 
to prove that Kalisz was with Remington during or immediately 
after the robbery and that he had the requisite mental state 
for the crime with which he was charged. Accordingly, the 
conviction is reversed, and Kalisz is ordered discharged. 
1. Section 76-2-202 provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the' commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encouragesi 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
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